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Abstract
We focus on generalized mixed modified semivalues, a family of mixed coalitional val-
ues. They apply to games with a coalition structure by combining a (induced) semivalue
in the quotient game, but share within each union the payoff so obtained by applying
different (induced) semivalues to a game that concerns only the players of that union. A
computation procedure in terms of the multilinear extension of the original game is also
provided and an application to the Catalan Parliament (legislature 2012–2016) is shown.
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1 Introduction
Introduced in 1974 by Aumann and Dre`ze [7], the notion of game with a coalition structure
gave a new impulsion to the development of value theory. These authors extended the Shapley
value to this new framework in such a manner that the game really splits into subgames played
by the unions isolatedly from each other, and every player receives the payoff allocated to him
by the Shapley value in the subgame he is playing within his union.
In 1977, a second approach was used by Owen [21], when introducing the first coalitional
value, called now theOwen value. The Owen value is the result of a two–step procedure: first,
the unions play a quotient game among themselves, and each one receives a payoff which, in
turn, is shared among its players in an internal game. Both payoffs, in the quotient game for
unions and within each union for its players, are given by the Shapley value.
In 1982, Owen [23] applied the same procedure to the Banzhaf value and obtained the
modified Banzhaf value or Owen–Banzhaf value. In this case the payoffs at both levels
(unions in the quotient game and players within each union) are given by the Banzhaf value.
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In 2002, Alonso and Fiestras [3] suggested to modify the two–step allocation scheme
and use the Banzhaf value for sharing in the quotient game and the Shapley value within
unions. This gave rise to the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value or Alonso–Fiestras value.
That same year, Amer, Carreras and Gime´nez [6] considered a sort of “counterpart” of the
Alonso–Fiestras value where the Shapley value is used in the quotient game and the Banzhaf
value within unions.
Thus, the possibilities to define a coalitional value by combining the Shapley and Banzhaf
values were complete at that moment. In 2011, Carreras and Puente [12] extended the bino-
mial semivalues to games with a coalitional structure: they used these values in the quotient
game and the Shapley value within unions and obtained the symmetric coalitional binomial
semivalues, a family depending on one parameter q 2 [0;1] (the Alonso–Fiestras value arises
for q= 1=2). In 2003, Amer and Gime´nez [5] considered coalitional values defined by using
a given semivalue in both steps of the procedure. In 2004 Albizuri and Zarzuelo [1] studied
coalitional values defined by any pair of semivalues (mixed modified semivalues), one in the
quotient game and the other within unions. Generalized mixed modified semivalues were in-
troduced by Albizuri [2] with the name of ‘generalized coalitional semivalues”. They apply a
semivalue in the quotient game that arises once the coalition structure is actually formed, but
share within each union the payoff so obtained by applying different semivalues to a game
that concerns only the players of that union.
In 1972, Owen [19] introduced the multilinear extension and applied it to the calculus of
the Shapley value. The computing technique based on the multilinear extension has been ap-
plied to many values: in 1975 to the Banzhaf value by Owen [20]; in 1992 to the Owen value
by Owen and Winter [24]; in 1994 to the Owen–Banzhaf value by Carreras and Magan˜a [9];
in 1997 to the quotient game by Carreras and Magan˜a [10]; in 2000 to binomial semivalues
and multinomial probabilistic indices by Puente [26]; in 2003 to coalitional semivalues by
Amer and Gime´nez [5]; in 2004 to the a–decisiveness and Banzhaf a–indices by Carreras
[8]; in 2005 to the Alonso–Fiestras value by Alonso, Carreras and Fiestras [4]; in 2011 to
symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues by Carreras and Puente [12]; in 2011 to semival-
ues by Carreras and Gime´nez in [11].
The present paper focus on giving a computational procedure for generalized mixed mod-
ified semivalues by means of the multilinear extension, generalizing the method obtained by
Carreras and Gime´nez in [11] to compute semivalues in cooperative games.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, a minimum of preliminaries
is provided. Section 3 is devoted to define generalized mixed modified semivalues and give
a procedure to compute them. Section 4 contains the application of the generalized mixed
modified values to the analysis of the Catalan Parliament (legislature 2012–2016).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Games and semivalues
Let N be a finite set of players and 2N be the set of its coalitions (subsets of N). A cooperative
game on N is a function v : 2N ! R, that assigns a real number v(S) to each coalition S N,
with v( /0) = 0. A game v is monotonic if v(S)  v(T ) whenever S  T  N and simple if,
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moreover, v(S) = 0 or 1 for every S  N. A player i 2 N is a dummy in v if v(S[fig) =
v(S)+ v(fig) for all S  Nnfig, and null in v if, moreover, v(fig) = 0. Two players i; j 2 N
are symmetric in v if v(S[fig) = v(S[f jg) for all S Nnfi; jg. Given a nonempty coalition
T  N, the restriction to T of a given game v on N is the game vjT on T that we will call a
subgame of v and is defined by vjT (S) = v(S) for all S T .
Endowed with the natural operations for real–valued functions, i.e. v+ v0 and lv for all
l 2 R, the set of all cooperative games on N is a vector space GN . For every nonempty
coalition T  N, the unanimity game uT is defined by uT (S) = 1 if T  S and uT (S) = 0
otherwise, and it is easily checked that the set of all unanimity games is a basis for GN , so
that dim(GN) = 2n 1 if n= jNj. Each game v 2 GN can then be uniquely written as a linear
combination of unanimity games, and its components are the Harsanyi dividends (Harsanyi
[18]):
v= å
TN: T 6= /0
aTuT ; where aT = aT (v) = å
ST
( 1)t sv(S) (1)
and, as usual, t = jT j and s= jSj.
By a value on GN we will mean a map f :GN !RN , that assigns to every game v a vector
f [v] with components fi[v] for all i 2 N.
Following Weber’s [28] axiomatic description, y : GN !RN is a semivalue iff it satisfies
the following properties:
(i) linearity: y[v+ v0] = y[v]+y[v0] (additivity) and y[lv] = ly[v] for all v;v0 2 GN and
l 2 R;
(ii) anonymity: yqi[qv] = yi[v] for all permutation q on N, i 2 N, and v 2 GN ;
(iii) positivity: if v is monotonic, then y[v] 0;
(iv) dummy player property: if i 2 N is a dummy in game v, then yi[v] = v(fig).
There is an interesting characterization of semivalues, by means of weighting coefficients,
due to Dubey, Neyman and Weber [15]. Set n = jNj. Then: (a) for every weighting vector
fpkgn 1k=0 such that
n 1
å
k=0
pk
 n 1
k

= 1 and pk  0 for all k, the expression
yi[v] = å
SNnfig
ps[v(S[fig)  v(S)] for all i 2 N and all v 2 GN ;
where s= jSj, defines a semivalue y; (b) conversely, every semivalue can be obtained in this
way; (c) the correspondence given by fpkgn 1k=0 7! y is bijective.
Thus, the payoff that a semivalue allocates to every player in any game is a weighted sum
of his marginal contributions in the game. If pk is interpreted as the probability that a given
player i joins a coalition of size k, provided that all the coalitions of a common size have
the same probability of being joined, then yi[v] is the expected marginal contribution of that
player to a random coalition he joins.
Well known examples of semivalues are the Shapley value j (Shapley [27]), for which
pk = 1=n
 n 1
k

, and the Banzhaf value b (Owen [20]), for which pk = 21 n. The Shapley
value j is the only efficient semivalue, in the sense that å
i2N
ji[v] = v(N) for every v 2 GN .
Notice that these values are defined for each N. The same happens with the binomial
semivalues, introduced by Puente [26] (see also Gime´nez [17] or Amer and Gime´nez [5])
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as follows. Let p 2 [0;1] and pk = pk(1  p)n k 1 for k = 0;1; : : : ;n  1. Then fpkgn 1k=0
is a weighting vector and defines a semivalue that will be denoted as yp and called the p–
binomial semivalue. Using the convention that 00 = 1, the definition makes sense also for
p = 0 and p = 1, where we respectively get the dictatorial index y0 and the marginal index
y1, introduced by Owen [22] and such that y0i [v] = v(fig) and y1i [v] = v(N)  v(Nnfig) for
all i 2 N and all v 2 GN . Of course, p= 1=2 gives y1=2 = b—the Banzhaf value.
In fact, semivalues are defined on cardinalities rather than on specific player sets: this
means that a weighting vector fpkgn 1k=0 defines a semivalue y on all N such that n = jNj.
When necessary, we shall write y(n) for a semivalue on cardinality n and pnk for its weighting
coefficients. A semivalue y(n) induces semivalues y(t) for all cardinalities t < n, recurrently
defined by the Pascal triangle (inverse) formula given by Dragan [14]:
ptk = p
t+1
k + p
t+1
k+1 for 0 k < t; (2)
A series y = fy(n)g¥n=1 of semivalues, one for each cardinality, is a multisemivalue if it
satisfies Dragan’s recurrence formula. Thus, the Shapley and Banzhaf values and all binomial
semivalues are multisemivalues. By applying Eqs. (2) repeatedly, one gets the expression of
the weighting coefficients of any induced semivalue in terms of the coefficients of the original
semivalue, namely
pts =
n t
å
j=0

n  t
j

pns+ j for 1 s< t < n: (3)
The multilinear extension1 [19] of a game v 2 GN is the real–valued function defined on
RN by
fv(XN) = å
SN
Õ
i2S
xi Õ
j2NnS
(1  x j)v(S): (4)
where XN denotes the set of variables xi for i 2 N. The following properties directly derive
from the definition:
(i) If v;w 2 GN and l;µ 2 R, then flv+µw = l fv+µ fw.
(ii) If /0 6= T  N, then fuT (XN) =Õ
i2T
xi.
(iii) In general, if v= å
TN: T 6= /0
aTuT , then fv(XN) = å
TN: T 6= /0
aTÕ
i2T
xi.
(iv) If v 2 GN and /0 6= T  N, then fvjT (XT ) = fv(XT ;0NnT ), where (XT ;0NnT ) denotes the
set XN with xi = 0 for all i 2 NnT , and v(T ) = fv(1T ;0NnT ), where 1T means xi = 1 for
all i 2 T . Moreover,
¶ fvjT
¶xi
(1T ) = v(T )  v(Tnfig):
In particular,
¶ fv
¶xi
(1N) = v(N)  v(Nnfig) for each i 2 N.
1The term “multilinear” means that, for each i 2 N, the function is linear in xi, that is, of the form
fv(x1;x2; : : : ;xn) = gi(x1;x2; : : : ; x^i; : : : ;xn)xi+hi(x1;x2; : : : ; x^i; : : : ;xn).
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As is well known, both the Shapley and Banzhaf values of any game v can be easily
obtained from its multilinear extension. Indeed, j[v] can be calculated by integrating the
partial derivatives of the multilinear extension of the game along the main diagonal x1 =
x2 =   = xn of the cube [0;1]N (Owen [19]), while the partial derivatives of that multilinear
extension evaluated at point (1=2;1=2; : : : ;1=2) give b[v] (Owen [20]. This latter procedure
extends well to any p–binomial semivalue (see Puente [26], Freixas and Puente [16] or Amer
and Gime´nez [5]) by evaluating the derivatives at point (p; p; : : : ; p).
2.2 Games with coalition structure
Given N = f1;2; : : : ;ng, we will denote by B(N) the set of all partitions of N. Each B 2 B(N)
is called a coalition structure in N, and a union each member of B. The so–called trivial
coalition structures are Bn = ff1g;f2g; : : : ;fngg (individual coalitions) and BN = fNg (grand
coalition). A cooperative game with a coalition structure is a pair [v;B], where v 2 GN and
B 2 B(N) for a given N. Each partition B gives a pattern of cooperation among players. We
denote by G csN = GN B(N) the set of all cooperative games with a coalition structure and
player set N.
If [v;B] 2 G csN and B = fB1;B2; : : : ;Bmg, the quotient game vB is the cooperative game
played by the unions or, rather, by the quotient set M = f1;2; : : : ;mg of their representatives,
as follows:
vB(R) = v(
[
r2R
Br) for all RM:
By a coalitional value on G csN we will mean a map g : G csN ! RN , which assigns to every
pair [v;B] a vector g[v;B] with components gi[v;B] for each i 2 N.
If f is a value on GN and g is a coalitional value on G csN , it is said that g is a coalitional
value of f iff g[v;Bn] = f [v] for all v2GN . For instance, the Owen value is a coalitional value
of the Shapley value j in the sense that F[v;Bn] = j[v] for all v 2 GN . Besides, F[v;BN ] =
j[v].
2.3 Mixed modified semivalues
Given two semivalues y and f defined on games with n players (with possibly f = y), Al-
bizuri and Zarzuelo [1] defined the concept of mixed modified semivalue for games with
coalition structure. They also proved that every mixed modified semivalue is a coalitional
semivalue and, reciprocally, every coalitional semivalue has this form.
If [v;B] 2 G csN and B = fB1;B2; : : : ;Bmg, the modified quotient game vB j jK is defined as
follows:
vB j jK(L) = v(
[
l2L
Bl nK0) for all LM;
where K0 = B j nK. This is the game played by the partition classes with the exception of B j,
that is replaced by the subset K. Given a semivalue y 2 GN , since the game uB j jK is defined
on a set M with m players (1 m n), we can apply the induced semivalue y(m):
w j(K) = (y(m)) j[uB j jK ] 8K  B j: (5)
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The value w j(K) shows the strategic position of the subset K  B j if this subset directly
negotiate with the other classes as players in the quotient game –according to the semivalue
induced by y– in absence of K0 = B j nK.
Next, since the game w j is defined on B j, a set with b j = jB jj players (1  b j  n), we
can apply the induced semivalue f(b j) and we define the mixed semivalue y=f modified by
the coalition structure B as  
y=f

i[v;B] = (f
(b j))i[w j] 8i 2 B j:
The mixed semivalue y=f yields the result of a two–step bargaining procedure analogous
to that used in [21, 23] and also in [3, 12]. Indeed, here we first apply the semivalue induced
by y in the quotient game to get a payoff for each union; next, we use within union B j the
semivalue induced by f to share the payoff by applying it to a reduced game played in this
union.
If y and f are respectively defined by the weighting coefficients (qns )
n 1
s=0 and (p
n
s )
n 1
s=0 ,
according to [1], the payoff given by the mixed modified y=f semivalue to every player i in
B j 2 B, is  
y=f

i[v;B] = å
RMnf jg
qmr å
SB jnfig
p
b j
s [v(Q[S[fig)  v(Q[S)] (6)
where Q=
[
r2R
Br, b j = jB jj, and s= jSj.
3 Generalized mixed modified semivalues
Generalized mixed modified semivalues, from now on GMMS, were introduced by Albizuri
[2] with the name of ‘generalized coalitional semivalues”. They apply a (induced) semivalue
in the quotient game that arises once the coalition structure is actually formed, but share
within each union the payoff so obtained by applying different (induced) semivalues to a
game that concerns only the players of that union.
Definition 3.1 Let [v;B] 2 G csN and B= fB1;B2; : : : ;Bmg a coalition structure in N. If y, j1,
. . . ,jm are m+1 semivalues in GN , we define the GMMS y=j1   jm by 
y=j1   jm

i[v;B] =
 
y=j j

i[v;B] 8i 2 B j ( j = 1; : : : ;m): (7)
From now on we will denote
 
y=j1   jm

i[v;B] by Fi[v;B].
Lemma 3.2 Let [v;B]2G csN , B= fB1;B2; : : : ;Bmg a coalition structure in N andF a GMMS
defined by m+ 1 semivalues in GN . The allocations given by F to players belonging to a
union B j can be obtained as a linear combination of the allocations to unanimity games uT ,
where T =V [W, V  B j and W 2 2BnB j .
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.
Proof Each game v 2 GN can be uniquely written as linear combination of unanimity games
v= å
TN: T 6= /0
aTuT ; where aT = aT (v) = å
ST
( 1)t sv(S):
For all i 2 B j, by linearity, Fi[v;B] = åTN: T 6= /0aTFi[uT ] and it suffices consider unanimity
games uT with
T =V [Ai1 [Ai2 [ : : :[Aip ; V  B j; fi1; i2; :::; ipg M nf jg; /0 6= Aiq  Biq ; q= 1; :::; p:
According to Definition 3.1 and by using expression (6), it is easy to check that the allocations
to players in B j only depend on the allocations in the unanimity games defined on inside
coalitions in B j and entire unions outside B j. That is,
Fi[uT ;B] =Fi[uV[Ai1[Ai2[:::[Aip ;B] =Fi[uV[Bi1[Bi2[:::[Bip ;B]: 
Notice that the number of unanimity games of this form is (2b j   1)2m with b j = jB jj and
m= jMj.
Proposition 3.3 Let B = fB1;B2; : : : ;Bmg be a coalition structure in N and F a GMMS
defined by m+ 1 semivalues in GN , y, j1, . . . ,jm. Fixed a union B j, the allocation to
a player i belonging to B j in a unanimity game uT , T = V [ Bi1 [   [ Bih , V  B j and
fi1; :::; ihg M nf jg is given by
Fi[uT ;B] =
 
y=j j

i[uT ;B] =
8<: q
h+1
h p
v
v 1 i 2 T
0 i =2 T
where the weighting coefficients of the induced semivalues (qh+1s )
h
s=0 and (p
v
s)
v 1
s=0 are ob-
tained following (2) from the weighting coefficients (qns )
n 1
s=0 and (p
n
s )
n 1
s=0 of the semivalues y
and j j respectively.
Proof For i 2 T , according to (6) we have
Fi[uT ;B] = å
RMnf jg
qmr å
SB jnfig
p
b j
s [uT (Q[S[fig) uT (Q[S)]
where Q=
[
r2R
Br, b j = jB jj, and s= jSj.
Only uT (Q[S[fig) uT (Q[S) does not vanish for coalitions R such that fi1; :::; ihg 
RM nf jg and for coalitions S such that V nfig  S  B j nfig. Then, according to Eq.(3)
for induced weights, we have
Fi[uT ;B] =
m 1
å
r=h

m 1 h
r h

qmr
b j 1
å
s=v 1

b j  v
s  v+1

p
b j
s = qh+1h p
v
v 1
In case of i 62 T , all marginal contributions uT (Q[S[fig) uT (Q[S) vanish. 
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Example 3.4 On the players set N = f1;2;3;4;5;6g, let B = ff1;2;3g;f4;5g;f6gg be a
coalition structure on N and F a GMMS defined by the semivalues in GN , y, j1, j2, and j3,
wherey=j is the Shapley value and j1 is defined by the weighting coefficients (p6s )6s=0=(1/24,
3/80, 1/30, 7/240, 1/40, 1/48).
We will obtain the allocations to players i 2 B1 according to F for the unanimity games
uf1;2;4;6g and uf1;2;4;5;6g. They are
Fi[uf1;2;4;6g;B] = q32 p
2
1 =
1
3
7
15
=
7
45
; for i= 1;2 and
F3[uf1;2;4;6g;B] = 0;
where p21 =
4
å
k=0

4
k

p61+k = 7=15 is the corresponding weighting coefficient of the in-
duced semivalue.
In a similar way and according to Lemma 3.2, for uf1;2;4;5;6g we obtain
Fi[uf1;2;4;5;6g;B] = q32 p
2
1 =
1
3
7
15
=
7
45
; for i= 1;2 and
F3[uf1;2;4;5;6g;B] = 0;
Notice that the allocations in both games are the same because coalitions f1;2;4;6g and
f1;2;4;5;6g intersect the same unions B2 and B3.
For players in B1, their allocations does not depend on the remaining semivalues j2 and
j3.
The computing technique based on the multilinear extension has been applied to many
coalitional values: in 1992 to the Owen value by Owen and Winter [24]; in 1994 to the
Owen–Banzhaf value by Carreras and Magan˜a [9]; in 1997 to the quotient game by Carreras
and Magan˜a [10]; in 2003 to coalitional semivalues by Amer and Gime´nez [5]; in 2005 to the
Alonso–Fiestras value by Alonso, Carreras and Fiestras [4]; in 2011 to symmetric coalitional
binomial semivalues by Carreras and Puente [12]; and to coalitional multinomial probabilistic
values iby Carreras and Puente [13]. In next theorem we present a method to compute any
GMMS by means of the multilinear extension of the game.
Theorem 3.5 Let [v;B] 2 G csN , B = fB1;B2; : : : ;Bmg a coalition structure in N and F a
GMMS defined by m+1 semivalues in GN , y, j1, . . . ,jm with weighting coefficients (qns )n 1s=0
and (pr;ns )n 1s=0 , r = 1; :::;m, respectively.
Then the following steps lead to the GMMS value of any player i 2 B j in [v;B].
1. Obtain the multilinear extension f (x1;x2; : : : ;xn) of game v.
2. For every r 6= j and all h 2 Br, replace the variable xh with yr. This yields a new
function of xk for k 2 B j and yr for r 2Mnf jg.
3. In this new function, reduce to 1 all higher exponents, i.e. replace with yr each y
q
r such
that q > 1. This gives a new multilinear function denoted as g j((xk)k2B j ; (yr)r2Mnf jg)
(The modified multilinear extension of union B j).
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4. After some calculus, the obtained modified multilinear extension reduces to
g j((xk)k2B j ; (yr)r2Mnf jg) = å
VB j
å
WMnf jg
lV[W Õ
k2V
xkÕ
r2W
yr
5. Multiply each productÕk2V xk by p
j;v
v 1 and each productÕr2W yr by q
w+1
w obtaining a
new multilinear function called g j.
6. Obtain the partial derivative of g j with respect to xi evaluated at point (1; : : : ;1) and
Fi[v;B] =
¶g j
¶xi
(1B j ;1Mnf jg):
Proof Steps 1–3 have been already used in [24, 9, 26, 16, 4, 12, 13] to obtain the modified
multilinear extension of union B j. Step 4 shows the modified multilinear extension as a linear
combination of multilinear extensions of unanimity games. Step 5 weights each unanimity
game according to Proposition 3.3 so that step 6 gives as usual the marginal contribution of
player i and his allocation Fi[v;B] is obtained. 
The following corollary shows as this procedure can be applied to compute semivalues
allocations from the MLE of a cooperative game, in a similar way given by Carreras and
Gime´nez [11].
Corollary 3.6 Let v 2 GN and Y a semivalue defined in GN by the weighting coefficient pns ,
s= 0; :::;n 1. Then the following steps lead to the allocation of any player i 2 N in game v.
1. Obtain the multilinear extension f (x1;x2; : : : ;xn) of game v as a sum of products
f (x1;x2; : : : ;xn) = å
SN
aSÕ
k2S
xk
2. Multiply each product Õk2V xk by pvv 1 obtaining a new multilinear function called f .
3. Obtain the partial derivative of f with respect to xi evaluated at point (1; : : : ;1) and
Yi[v] =
¶ f
¶xi
(1N):
Proof Considerer the coalition structure given by the grand coalition B= BN = fNg. In this
case, semivalue Y[v] coincides with the GMMS F[v;BN ]. Then, applying Theorem 3.5 and
taking into account that coefficient q10 = 1, we easily obtain Yi[v] =
¶ f
¶xi
(1N): 
Example 3.7 Let v [68;50;21;20;19;13;9;3] be the 7–person weighted majority game and
the coalition structure B= ff1g;f2;3;5g;f4g;f6g;f7gg. We will computeF[v;B], where the
GMMSF is defined by 6 semivalues in GN , y, j1, . . . ,j5 with weighting coefficients (q7s )6s=0
and (pr;7s )6s=0, r = 1; :::;5, respectively.
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The set of minimal winning coalitions of the game is
Wm(v) = ff1;2g;f1;3g;f1;4g;f1;5;6gg;
so that players 2, 3 and 4 on one hand, and 5 and 6 on the other, are symmetric in v. Moreover,
player 7 is null and the multilinear extension of v is
f (XN) =x1x2+ x1x3+ x1x4  x1x2x3  x1x2x4  x1x3x4+ x1x5x6+ x1x2x3x4
  x1x2x5x6  x1x3x5x6  x1x4x5x6+ x2x3x4x5+ x2x3x4x6  x1x2x3x4x5
  x1x2x3x4x6+ x1x2x3x5x6+ x1x2x4x5x6+ x1x3x4x5x6  x2x3x4x5x6:
The coalition structure is B= ff1g;f2;3;5g;f4g;f6g;f7gg and steps 1–4 in Theorem 3.5
give the modified multilinear extension of each union B j, for j = 1;2;3;4 (notice that player
7 is null in v and it is not necessary to compute g5).
g1(x1;y2;y3;y4;y5) = x1y2+ x1y3 2x1y2y3+ y2y3;
g2(x2;x3;x5;y1;y3;y4;y5) = x2y1+ x3y1+ y1y3  x2x3y1  x2y1y3  x3y1y3+ x5y1y4+ x2x3y1y3
  x2x5y1y4  x3x5y1y4  x5y1y3y4+ x2x3x5y3+ x2x3y3y4  x2x3x5y1y3
  x2x3y1y3y4+ x2x3x5y1y4+ x2x5y1y3y4+ x3x5y1y3y4  x2x3x5y3y4;
g3(x4;y1;y2;y4;y5) = y1y2+ x4y1+ x4y2 2x4y1y2;
g4(x6;y1;y2;y3;y5) = y1y2+ y1y3+ y2y3 2y1y2y3:
Step 5 leads to g j for each j = 1;2;3;4.
g1(x1;y2;y3;y4;y5) = p
1;1
0 q
2
1x1y2+ p
1;1
0 q
2
1x1y3 2p1;10 q32x1y2y3+q32y2y3;
g2(x2;x3;x5;y1;y3;y4;y5) = p
2;1
0 q
2
1x2y1+ p
2;1
0 q
2
1x3y1+q
3
2y1y3  p2;21 q21x2x3y1  p2;10 q32x2y1y3
  p2;10 q32x3y1y3+ p2;10 q32x5y1y4+ p2;21 q32x2x3y1y3  p2;21 q32x2x5y1y4  p2;21 q32x3x5y1y4
  p2;10 q43x5y1y3y4+ p2;32 q21x2x3x5y3+ p2;21 q32x2x3y3y4  p2;32 q32x2x3x5y1y3  p2;21 q43x2x3y1y3y4
+ p2;32 q
3
2x2x3x5y1y4+ p
2;2
1 q
4
3x2x5y1y3y4+ p
2;2
1 q
4
3x3x5y1y3y4  p2;32 q32x2x3x5y3y4;
g3(x4;y1;y2;y4;y5) = q
3
2y1y2+ p
3;1
0 q
2
1x4y1+ p
3;1
0 q
2
1x4y2 2p3;10 q32x4y1y2;
g4(x6;y1;y2;y3;y5) = q
3
2y1y2+q
3
2y1y3+q
3
2y2y3 2q43y1y2y3:
Step 6 yields
F1[v;B] = 2p1;10 q
2
1 2p1;10 q32;
Fi[v;B] = p2;10 q
2
1  p2;21 q21  p2;10 q32+ p2;21 q32+ p2;32 q21  p2;32 q32; for i= 2;3;
F4[v;B] = 2p3;10 q
2
1 2p3;10 q32;
F5[v;B] = p2;10 q
3
2 2p2;21 q32  p2;10 q43+ p2;32 q21  p2;32 q32+2p2;21 q43;
F6[v;B] = 0;
F7[v;B] = 0:
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4 The Catalan Parliament. Legislature 2012–2016
In this section we will revisit Example 3.7 and will complete, by applying different GMMS’s,
the study initiated there to an interesting political structure: the Catalan Parliament (Legisla-
ture 2012–2016). All allocations we will need have been computed using Theorem 3.5, most
of them in Example 3.7.
Seven parties elected members to the Catalonia Parliament (135 seats) in the elections
held on 25 November 2012. The seat distribution of the parties are as follows.
1: CiU (Converge`ncia i Unio´), Catalan nationalist middle–of–the–road coalition of two
federated parties: 50 seats.
2: ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya), Catalan nationalist left–wing party: 21
seats.
3: PSC (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya), moderate left–wing socialist party, federated
to the Partido Socialista Obrero Espan˜ol: 20 seats.
4: PPC (Partit Popular de Catalunya), conservative party, Catalan delegation of the Partido
Popular: 19 seats.
5: ICV (Iniciativa per Catalunya–Verds), coalition of Catalan eurocommunist parties, fed-
erated to Izquierda Unida, and ecologist groups (“Verds”): 13 seats.
6: C’s (Ciutadans), Spanish nationalist liberal party: 9 seats.
7: CUP (Candidatura d’unitat popular), radical left–wing catalanist party organized by
assemblies: 3 seats.
Under the standard absolute majority rule, and assuming voting discipline within parties,
the structure of this parliamentary body can be represented by the weighted majority game
v [68;50;21;20;19;13;9;3]:
Therefore, the strategic situation is given by
Wm(v) = ff1;2g;f1;3g;f1;4g;f1;5;6gg;
so that players 2, 3 and 4 on one hand, and 5 and 6 on the other, are symmetric in v. Moreover,
player 7 is null.
The calculation of Y[v] for an arbitrary semivalue with weighting coefficients (p7s )6s=0
derives from Corollary 3.6 considering the coalition structure given by the grand coalition
BN = ff1;2;3;4;5;6;7gg. We get:
Y1[v] = 3p21 2p32 2p43+ p54;
Yi[v] = p21 2p32+2p43  p54; for i= 2;3;4;
Yi[v] = p32 2p43+ p54; for i= 5;6;
Y7[v] = 0:
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We show in Table 1 the allocations for every player in game v according to the Shapley
(j) and Banzhaf (b) values and the p–binomial value with p = 1=3 (y1=3). Notice that the
weighting coefficients pss 1 for these values are respectively p
s
s 1 =
1
s
, pss 1 =
1
2s 1
and
pss 1 = p
s 1.
Table 1. Initial power distribution in the Catalonia Parliament 2012–2016
Value 1. CiU 2. ERC 3. PSC 4. PPC 5. ICV 6. C’s 7. CUP
ji[v] 0.5333 0.1333 0.1333 0.1333 0.0333 0.0333 0.0000
bi[v] 0.8125 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.0625 0.0625 0.0000
y1=3 0.7160 0.1728 0.1728 0.1728 0.0494 0.0494 0.0000
Wewill not attempt to give here a full description of the complexity of the Catalan politics,
a task more suitable for a political science article. We wish only to state that, in view of
all these components, the politically most likely coalitions to form, and the corresponding
coalition structures, are the following:
 ERC + PSC + ICV, the left alliance: BL = ff1g;f2;3;5g;f4g;f6g;f7gg.
 CiU + ERC, the Catalanist majority alliance: BC = ff1;2g;f3g;f4g;f5g;f6g;f7gg.
In order to evaluate the strategic possibilities of each party we apply F[v;B] in cases
B= BL (see Example 3.7) and B= BC according to the Owen value, the Owen–Banhaf value,
the Alonso and Fiestras value, the symmetric coalitional binomial valueWp with p= 1=3 and
the mixed semivalue µ defined by the coefficients
(q7s )
6
s=0 =

6  s
192
6
s=0
and (p7s )
6
s=0 =

26 s
36
6
s=0
:
Notice that the first coefficients refer to an arithmetic semivalue with increase  1=192 and
the second ones to the binomial semivalue with p= 1=3. Now the last weighting coefficients
for the induced arithmetic semivalue are:
q65 = 1=192; q
5
4 = 1=48; q
4
3 = 1=16; q
3
2 = 1=6; q
2
1 = 5=12 and q
1
0 = 1:
In this case player 7 (CUP) is null in the quotient game and then F7[v;B] = 0. The results
obtained in case of the left alliance for the remaining players are given in Table 2.
Table 2. Different GMMS in the Catalonia Parliament 2012–2016 (the left–wing alliance)
Value 1. CiU 2. ERC 3. PSC 4. PPC 5. ICV 6. C’s
Owen 0.3333 0.1389 0.1389 0.3333 0.0556 0.0000
Owen–Banzhaf 0.5000 0.1875 0.1875 0.5000 0.0625 0.0000
Alonso–Fiestras 0.5000 0.2083 0.2083 0.5000 0.0833 0.0000
Sym. coalitional (p= 1=3) 0.4444 0.1852 0.1852 0.4444 0.0741 0.0000
Mixed semivalue µ 0.5000 0.1944 0.1944 0.5000 0.0625 0.0000
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In case B = BC players 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 became null in the quotient game and then
Fi[v;B] = 0 for all of them. We only need to calculate the modified multilinear extension
g1.
g1(x1;x2;y2; :::;y6) =x1x2+ x1y2+ x1y3  x1x2y2  x1x2y3  x1y2y3+ x1y4y5+ x1x2y2y3
  x1x2y4y5  x1y2y4y5  x1y3y4y5+ x2y2y3y4+ x2y2y3y5  x1x2y2y3y4
  x1x2y2y3y5+ x1x2y2y4y5+ x1x2y3y4y5+ x1y2y3y4y5  x2y2y3y4y5:
Following the same procedure as the previous alliance, the results obtained for the Cata-
lanist majority alliance for players 1 and 2 are given in Table 3.
Table 3. Different GMMS in the Catalonia Parliament 2012–2016 (the Catalanist majority alliance)
Value 1. CiU 2. ERC
Owen 0.7000 0.3000
Owen–Banzhaf 0.8125 0.1875
Alonso–Fiestras 0.8125 0.1875
Symmetric coalitional binomial (p= 1=3) 0.7716 0.2284
Mixed semivalue µ 0.7847 0.1597
In order to form a government coalition in the two last Legislatures (2003–2007 prema-
turely finished in 2006 and 2006–2010) the role of ERC was crucial. Thus, in both cases ERC
was faced to the dilemma of choosing among either a Catalanist majority coalition with CiU
or a left–wing majority coalition with PSC and ICV, which was finally formed in 2003 and
was repeated in 2006.
In the present Legislature, studied here, the politic scenario and parties’ strategic possi-
bilities have changed. Among the different possibilities, the two alliances above considered
have been the most commented in the Parliament and in the media. According to the left–
wing alliance and comparing the results obtained in Table 1 and Table 2, ERC does not get
a significant benefit regarding PSC. When considering the Catalanist majority alliance, the
outside parties are reduced to a null position and the power of ERC increases regarding the
initial power in v (see Table 1 and Table 3). However, ERC’s current decision has not been to
form a government coalition with CiU.
5 Concluding remarks
The present work is focussed on the calculus of generalized modified mixed semivalues.
More precisely, the computation of allocations to the players can be obtained from the mul-
tilinear extension by using a common procedure for all GMMS. As is well known, both the
Shapley and Banzhaf values of any game v can be easily obtained from its multilinear ex-
tension. This latter procedure extends well to any p–binomial semivalue (see Puente [26],
Freixas and Puente [16] or Amer and Gime´nez [5]).
In the context of games with a coalition structure, the multilinear extension technique
has been also applied to computing the Owen value (Owen and Winter [24]), as well as the
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Owen–Banzhaf value (Carreras and Magan˜a [9]), the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value
(Alonso, Carreras and Fiestras [4]), the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalue (Carreras
and Puente [12]) and the multinomial coaltional probabilistic values (Carreras and Puente
[13]). In all these cases, (including the GMMS) the first three steps of the procedure are the
same.
Instead, the consideration of the modified MLE g j for the union B j obtained from the
initial one has changed the procedure: first, we weight the terms of g j multiplying each prod-
uct Õk2V xk by pvv 1 and each product Õr2W yr by q
w+1
w obtaining a new multilinear function
called g j. Second, we obtain players’ marginal contributions by partial differentiation of g j.
This new procedure has an advantage with respect to the traditional method: the allocations
given by any coalitional semivalue are available since the weighting coefficients pk 1k and
qk+1k can be always obtained.
Finally, the procedure presented here is a generalization of the method given by Carreras
and Gime´nez [11] to compute semivalues allocations from the MLE of a cooperative game.
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